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Germany’s position on the establishment of the European Union
The signing of the Single European Act on 17/28 February 1986 that provided for the establishment of the internal market by the end of 1992, including the liber-
alisation of capital movements, naturally stepped up the efforts taken by the Member 
States of the European Communities aiming to form the Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (EMU). This was due to the fact that the free movement of capital within the Euro-
pean Communities posed a genuine risk to exchange rate stability, since exchange rate 
volatility could have hindered the free flow of goods and services.2 From this stand-
point, not only did the establishment of the EMU correspond to the interests of France 
and Germany but also to the expectations of other Member States of the European 
Communities. This idea was supported by the Benelux countries that had formed the 
Benelux Economic Union themselves already on 1 November 1960. In turn, economi-
cally weaker Member States, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, expected 
their economies to experience positive outcomes as a result of enhanced integra-
tion. Nonetheless, all Member States pursued to undermine the previously dominant 
position of Deutsche Bank in the European Monetary System, which manifested as 
a necessity of central banks of the said countries to adapt themselves to the restric-
tive monetary policy of Deutsche Bank. However, though Germany could afford such 
a restrictive policy owing to, i.a. the strength of the Deutschmark and the long years of 
low inflation rate, it oftentimes was not corresponding to the economic growth policies 
implemented by other countries. Thus, for most of them the establishment of the EMU, 
1 The article was written as part of the project Jean Monnet Chair – EUCRIS: European Union in Crisis. 
What is Wrong and How to Fix It? The Grant awarded by the European Union.
2 L. Oręziak, Integracja walutowa [in:] Unia Europejska, red. K. Michałowska-Gorywoda, Warszawa 1998, 
pp. 227–228. K. Gawlikowska-Hueckel, A. Zielińska-Głębocka, Integracja europejska. Od jednolitego rynku do 
unii walutowej, Warszawa 2004, p. 262.
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particularly the founding of the European Central Bank (ECB), was to serve as a path 
towards joint decision-making in monetary policy.3 
Enhanced integration was initiated in the monetary and economic areas, as well as 
political and military areas within the European Communities mainly by President of 
France François Mitterrand. The primary aim of the French President’s strategy was to 
form a permanent bond between the uniting Germany and the European Communities, 
which was expected to counteract the possible growth of German influence in Europe 
more effectively than before. The strengthening of monetary and economic integra-
tion was intended as an “insurance protection” against risk resulting from the German 
reunification,4 since the EMU would further strengthen the bond between the united 
Germany and the Member States of the European Communities, and the said country 
would bear the largest share of the financial costs arising from the establishment of the 
EMU. However, the enhancement of political and military integration was perceived by 
Mitterrand, as once by de Gaulle, as a lever allowing for the international position of 
France to be strengthened. Under the said circumstances, the French government, previ-
ously highly reluctant to support this idea, was turning into one of the major advocates of 
the establishment of the European Union and the EMU starting from late 1989. The Ger-
man government, formerly one of the most dedicated supporters of enhanced integration, 
approved the establishment of the European Union and the EMU, looking forward to 
further strengthening Germany’s political and economic position in these organisations.5 
France, which held the Presidency of the European Communities in the second half 
of 1989, decided to undertake the diplomatic initiative. At the extraordinary European 
Council meeting in Paris (18 November 1989), France called upon governments of the 
Member States to convoke an intergovernmental conference as soon as was possible. 
However, this time intentions of the French government were not aligned with the 
aspirations held by the German authorities. A few days before the European Council 
meeting in Strasbourg (8–9 December 1989), Chancellor Helmut Kohl warned in his 
letter to Mitterrand that the conference must not be convened too soon, as he believed 
that the most significant concern to be addressed by his government at that time was 
the German reunification. Nevertheless, he made Germany’s approval for the founding 
of the EMU conditional on taking steps to create a Political Union and to implement 
in parallel the related reform of the institutional system of the European Communities, 
particularly to enlarge the competences of the European Parliament.6 
3 The increasing asymmetry in the dynamics of economic growth between the EC Member States, the 
United States and Japan was highly significant for the former, see: J.J.Węc, Spór o kształt ustrojowy Wspólnot Eu-
ropejskich i Unii Europejskiej w latach 1950–2010. Między ideą ponadnarodowości a współpracą międzyrządową, 
Kraków 2012, pp. 194–196. A. Nowak-Far, Unia Gospodarcza i Walutowa w Europie, Warszawa 2001, pp. 57–91.
4 J.J. Węc, op. cit., p. 195.
5 S. Hoffmann, French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe, [in:] R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, S. Hoff-
mann (eds.), After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 1989–1991, Cambrid-
ge 1994, pp. 127–147. T. Judt, Grosse Illusion Europa. Gefahren und Herausforderungen einer Idee, München–
Wien 1996.
6 U. Frenkler, Die Maastricht-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Machtpolitik oder Zivilmacht. Kon-
ferenzpapier zum Workshop “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik – Erste Befunde der europäischen Forschung”, Trier 
1998, p. 5.
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Further events were determined by conclusions adopted at two European Council 
meetings held in Dublin (25–26 June 1990) and Rome (14–15 December 1990). At the 
first of the two meetings, the European Council approved the joint initiative of Presi-
dent Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl proposed in April 1990 regarding the convening 
of two separate intergovernmental conferences. One of the said conferences was intend-
ed to address the issue of the establishment of Political Union, whereas the other was 
to be dedicated to the founding of the EMU.7 Six months later, the European Council 
adopted at a meeting in Rome guidelines for handling negotiations, according to which, 
i.a. the two conferences were to be held concurrently and their provisions were to be 
codified in one international agreement that would be ratified “before the end of 1992”.8 
The intergovernmental conference on Political Union (1990–1991)
The fundamental axis of debate at the intergovernmental conference on the estab-
lishment of Political Union was the system of this newly founded international or-
ganisation. Other controversial issues included powers of the European Parliament, 
economic and social cohesion, common foreign and security policy, as well as some 
matters concerning the judicial system and internal affairs.9 On 15–16 April 1991, 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques F. Poos presented a draft treaty establishing a po-
litical union based on a three-pillar structure. The first pillar was to cover the European 
Communities that, having formed a common market, were to be transformed into the 
EMU. These would be largely based on supranational cooperation. Whereas the second 
and the third pillars were to cover common foreign and security policy, and the judicial 
system and internal affairs, respectively, subject to the direct control of intergovern-
mental cooperation. The body intended to keep all the three pillars together was the 
European Council, which was to serve a decision-making principle in each of the said 
pillars. Several weeks later, the pillar structure of the future Political Union was opposed 
by as many as eight of all twelve foreign ministers of the Member States who met at an 
informal conference in Dresden (2–3 June 1991). Led by Foreign Minister of Germany 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Hans van den Broek, 
they called on the Luxembourg Presidency to devise a new draft treaty proposal that 
would provide for a unified structure of the future Political Union.10 
Highly significant differences between views of governments of particular EU Mem-
ber States pertained also to the Union’s common foreign and security policy. Though 
7 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council (25–26 June 1990), http://europa.eu/rapid/
searchResultAction.do, pp. 4–6 (access: 30.09.2018).
8 Presidency Conclusions of the Rome European Council (14–15 December 1990), http://europa.eu/
rapid/searchResultAction.do, pp. 9–10 (access: 30.09.2018). 
9 J.J.Węc, op. cit., pp. 201–204. M. Anderson, M. Den Boer, G. Miller, European Citizenship and Coopera-
tion in Justice and Home Affairs, [in:] A. Duff, J. Pinder, R. Pryce (eds.), Maastricht and Beyond. Building the 
European Union, London–New York 1995, pp. 104–122. 
10 G. Brunn, Die europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute, Bonn 2004, pp. 267–270. G. Brandstetter, Chro-
nologisches Lexikon der europäischen Integration 1945–1995, Wien 1996, pp. 176–177. K. Garvert, Europäische 
Integration – die Niederlande in Europa, Juli 2007, https://www.uni-muenster.de (access: 30.09.2018).
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the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal and Greece consented to the establishment of 
the second pillar based solely on intergovernmental cooperation, Germany, France, the 
Benelux countries and Italy with the support of the European Commission advocated 
that it should be granted a greater degree of autonomy and a significant independence 
from the governments of the Member States in the long run. Moreover, individual del-
egations were also divided on the possible cooperation in the area of common defence 
policy. Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain advocated the establish-
ment of a common defence policy of the Union in the future. In contrast, the United 
Kingdom, Portugal and the Netherlands considered these proposals with great caution, 
concerned that this could compromise the role of NATO in Europe.11
On 17–18 June 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency submitted the second draft treaty 
establishing a Political Union. However, in contrast to the Dresden postulates of for-
eign ministers, the new draft maintained the three-pillar model of the Union, though 
it strengthened the community method at the same time.12 The draft was adopted at 
the Luxembourg European Council of 28–29 June 1991 as the basis for further nego-
tiations.13 Concurrently, the European Council determined four principles the future 
Political Union ought to be based on, namely: first, an unlimited respect and further de-
velopment of the binding community law; second, a uniform institutional framework; 
thirdly, a deepened and enlarged European integration process; fourthly, compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as economic and social cohesion. Further-
more, the European Council declared its support for strengthening the position of the 
European Parliament in the institutional system by means of extending its supervisory 
powers (influence on the appointment of staff to the College of the Commission) and 
legislative powers (the co-decision procedure). An initial consensus was reached also 
with regard to defence policy of the future Union. Participants of the session agreed that 
the gradually growing independence of the European Communities in this area ought 
to significantly contribute to the strengthening of NATO.14 
However, opinions made by individual delegations immediately after the end of 
the meeting left no illusion as to the difficulties involved in reaching consensus. While 
President Mitterrand made no secret that the establishment of common foreign and 
security policy was the key issue for France, Chancellor Kohl strongly emphasised the 
need to form a federal system of the future Union, arguing that “without federal struc-
tures and the principle of subsidiarity, there is certainly no future for Europe.” Kohl 
considered Political Union and the EMU two sides of the same coin. In contrast, scepti-
cal comments on the blueprint for the Union as a whole were made by Prime Minister 
11 G. Edwards, S. Nuttall, Common Foreign and Security Policy, [in:] A. Duff, J. Pinder, R. Pryce (eds.), 
Maastricht and Beyond…, pp. 84–103.
12 G. Brandstetter, op. cit., pp. 178–179.
13 Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council (28–29 June 1991), http://europa.eu/
rapid/searchResultAction.do, pp. 1–2 (access: 30.09.2018). 
14 Ibidem. 
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of the United Kingdom John Major, though he did imply that further meetings of the 
intergovernmental conference would probably make room for a compromise.15 
Following the conclusions of the European Council, Foreign Minister of the Neth-
erlands van den Broek submitted a new draft treaty establishing a Political Union on 24 
September 1991. The said draft was substantially different to both former Luxembourg 
proposals in that instead of being based on the three pillars, the Union was to have a uni-
form supranational structure that would cover the European Communities, external re-
lations and internal security. Moreover, the position of the European Parliament in the 
institutional system was to be strengthened. However, most surprisingly for the Dutch 
Presidency, the draft was received by the governments of the Member States far less en-
thusiastically. On 30 September 1991, it was rejected at a meeting in Brussels by a majority 
of ten votes against two votes in favour, while at the same time, it was recommended that 
further negotiations should be based on the second Luxembourg draft. Though at the 
very beginning of June 1991 the establishment of a Political Union as an international 
organisation with a uniform system was strongly supported by Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Greece, less than three months later this willingness was 
declared only by two Member States, namely, the Netherlands and Belgium, supported 
by the European Commission and the European Parliament. Although the Dutch draft 
was in many respects consistent with the views of the federal government at the time, 
Germany distanced itself from the draft as well, eventually supporting the Luxembourg 
idea of establishing a Political Union based on the three-pillar structure.16 
Following the setback experienced in Brussels, the Dutch Presidency submitted on 
8 November 1991 its second draft treaty establishing a Political Union, which was es-
sentially based on the principles of the Luxembourg draft of 17 June of that year. At the 
time, it was severely criticised by community institutions, particularly the European 
Parliament. At the conclave of foreign ministers held in Noordwijk (12–13 November 
1991), President of the European Parliament Enrique Crespo defined it as thoroughly 
insufficient and lacking any vision for the future. Crespo argued that the three-pillar 
model of the Union does not follow the Dresden recommendations made by foreign 
ministers, leaving the common foreign and security policy beyond democratic control 
and limiting the co-decision power of the European Parliament to an overly reduced 
scope of matters. Though Crespo’s views were shared by Genscher, who proposed that 
the co-decision procedure should refer to all the areas where the Council of Ministers 
would act by qualified majority, this proposal was strongly rejected by British Foreign 
Minister Douglas Hurd, who was willing to grant the European Parliament the right 
of co-decision in matters regarding the internal market, at best. Another proposal of 
the German delegation to be disapproved by the majority of the meeting participants 
involved incorporating into the first pillar social policy and at least some issues regard-
ing the judicial system and internal affairs, such as immigration policy, asylum policy 
15 J.J. Węc, Spór o kształt ustrojowy…, pp. 202–203.
16 C. Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht, New York 1997, p. 148. U. Frenkler, Die Maastricht- 
Politik, pp. 6–7. W. Weidenfeld (ed.), Maastricht in der Analyse, Gütersloh 1994, pp. 305–347.
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or the fight against drug offences. No consensus was reached also at the meeting of 
foreign ministers in Brussels (3–4 December 1991), especially since some delegations 
submitted new controversial proposals for discussion.17 
The intergovernmental conference on Economic and Monetary Union 
(1990–1991)
In the first phase of the intergovernmental conference on the establishment of the 
Economic and Monetary Union held under the auspices of the Luxembourg Presidency, 
an agreement was reached, among others, on rules of the so-called external monetary 
policy, i.e. an exchange-rate policy for the ECU in relation to non-Community curren-
cies. The session participants agreed that the most substantial decisions in this regard 
will be made by the Council of Ministers in consultation with the ECB. Moreover, it 
was to decide on exchange market interventions implemented by the European System 
of Central Banks. During the second stage of the session held under the auspices of 
the Dutch Presidency, a blueprint for the EMU was agreed on, which was based on the 
objectives of Jacques Delors’ report of June 1989. The initial draft was submitted on 
29 October 1991 by Dutch Minister of Finance Wim Kok. The said document stipu-
lated that at the very beginning of the second phase of the implementation of the EMU 
(1 January 1994), treaty provisions should be made for the European Monetary System 
existing since 13 March 1979 and the European Monetary Institute (EMI) ought to be 
formed, whereas at the beginning of the third stage of this process (1 January 1997) the 
ECB was to be founded. In order to join the EMU, each Member State was required to 
satisfy four convergence criteria. The final version of the draft treaty on the Economic 
and Monetary Union was agreed on by ministers of finance on 1 December 1991 at 
a meeting in Scheveningen.18 
The course of the intergovernmental conference proved that governments of the 
Member States remained significantly divided on this issue, with the fundamental di-
viding line running between France and Germany, and the United Kingdom supported 
by Denmark. While France and Germany manifested their utmost interest in the blue-
print for the EMU, the United Kingdom remained the greatest critic and opponent of 
this endeavour. The German government agreed on economic and monetary integra-
tion, though it also expected that it will be extended into the political realm. Since the 
blueprint for the EMU did not provide for a communitarisation of fiscal policy, Ger-
many was concerned that in the future this could lead to colliding interests of the ECB’s 
17 France took the initiative to propose the establishment of a Congress of deputies of national parlia-
ments. However, Spain proposed that the treaty should involve binding arrangements on a progressive in-
crease in EU financial aid provided to the poorest Member States, see: F. Laursen, S. Vanhoonacker (eds.), The 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity 
of the European Community, Dordrecht 1992, pp. 37–225. R. Pryce, The Treaty Negotiations, [in:] A. Duff, 
J. Pinder, R. Pryce (eds.), Maastricht and Beyond…, pp. 36–52; R. Corbett, F. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, The Euro-
pean Parliament, London 2000, pp. 299–300.
18 J.J. Węc, op. cit., pp. 196–199, 204–205. 
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monetary policy and fiscal policy of individual Member States. The Political Union was 
to act as a safeguard against tensions between monetary policy and fiscal policy, and to 
ensure stable functioning of the EMU.19 The strategy adopted by French and German 
authorities was perfectly understandable to the British government, though the latter 
did not share their enthusiasm for monetary integration. Prime Minister Major fully 
identified with Margaret Thatcher’s opinion at the time, according to whom the found-
ing of the EMU could reinforce federalism. He assured that his government would 
never sign a treaty that envisaged a common European currency and uniform social 
legislation. Other representatives of the British government argued that administrative 
restrictions provided for in the draft treaty concerning the budget deficit and the way 
it was to be financed were redundant, since market rules were far more effective in 
disciplining the Member States’ fiscal policies.20 
The conclusions adopted at both intergovernmental conferences were later approved 
with minor amendments by the European Council at a session held on 9–10 Decem-
ber 1991 in Maastricht and codified in one treaty on European Union. The European 
Council stated in the adopted conclusions that the Intergovernmental Conference 
“reached agreement on the Draft Treaty on European Union based on the texts (doc. 
SN 252/1/91) concerning Political Union and on the Draft Treaty text concerning Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union”.21 On 7 February 1992, foreign ministers and ministers of 
finance of 12 Member States signed the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht, which 
entered into force on 1 November 1993.22
The intergovernmental conference of 1996–1997.  
The Amsterdam Treaty
Though the initiative to convene the 1990–1991 intergovernmental conferences was 
taken by France, the declaration of a subsequent intergovernmental conference 
was codified in the Treaty of Maastricht (Article N(2) TEU), while the run-up was 
executed by the Reflection Group chaired by Carlos Westendorp, the Secretary of State 
for European Affairs and later Foreign Minister of Spain. As in the case of previous in-
tergovernmental conferences, the governments of Germany and France strived to exert 
the greatest impact on the course of the said conference. Additionally, the federal gov-
ernment attempted to use the conference to define the new role of the Federal Republic 
within the European Union and international policy after the German reunification. 
Both governments submitted as many as four joint drafts of system reforms of the EU, 
which were then debated at the conference, though they did not gain recognition from 
its participants at all times. These included: Chancellor Kohl’s and newly elected French 
19 R. Pryce…, pp. 36–52. 
20 J.J. Węc, op. cit., pp. 205–206. L. Oręziak, op. cit., p. 276.
21 Presidency Conclusions of the Maastricht European Council (9–10 December 1991), http://europa.eu/
rapid/searchResultAction.do, pp. 1–3 (access: 30.09.2018).
22 Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, O.J. C, 1992, No. 191.
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President Jacques Chirac’s draft of 6 December 1995, proposals of foreign ministers 
Klaus Kinkel and Hervé de Charette of 27 February 1996 and 17 October 1996, as well 
as Kohl’s and Chirac’s draft of 9 December 1996. 
The first German-French draft reform was submitted to Prime Minister of Spain 
Felipe Gonzalez and, concurrently, to the President of the European Council. Both 
politicians considered it a priority to amend the draft reform with regard to the institu-
tional system, common foreign and security policy reform, as well as transformations 
within the judicial system and internal affairs, which would bring the European Union 
closer to its citizens. Transformations within the institutional system were intended to 
broaden the application of qualified majority voting in the EU Council “while verifying 
the currently binding weighted voting system,” taking into account the possibility to in-
troduce changes in the appointment procedure, the composition and powers of the Eu-
ropean Commission, as well as to simplify the cooperation within the ‘decision-making 
triangle’ (the European Commission-the Council of the European Union-the European 
Parliament). Overcoming the democracy deficit would require a greater involvement 
of the European Parliament and national parliaments in the legislative process in the 
Union, and conditions that would allow the principle of subsidiarity to be reinforced 
in practice. What is more, in reference to a proposal made by Wolfgang Schäuble, Karl 
Lamers and Édouard Balladur in 1994,23 they submitted a postulate for the introduction 
into the Treaty of Maastricht provisions that would determine conditions for establish-
ing enhanced cooperation as a new integration method stemming from the so-called 
flexible integration. Such cooperation could not prejudice the uniform institutional 
framework of the European Union and would have to be open to all Member States 
willing to join it at a later term.24
Over two months later on 27 February 1996, Foreign Ministers Kinkel and de 
Charette developed joint guidelines on the reform of the second pillar of the European 
Union, proposing, among others: that unanimous voting should be dropped as the 
23 On 1 September 1994, Schäuble and Lamers proposed on behalf of the CDU/CSU parliamentary fac-
tion to deepen integration by means of creating a “hard core” in the European Union that would include 
Germany, France and the Benelux countries. The above listed states were to act as the foundation of the future 
Political Union. The “hard core” was to be open to the accession of other EU Member States in the future, par-
ticularly the United Kingdom. Moreover, Schäuble and Lamers spoke in favour of granting treaty status to the 
so-called flexible integration. On 30 August 1994, in Le Monde French Prime Minister Balladur put forward 
a proposal to establish three ‘concentric circles’ in the European Union. The first of the said circles was to 
involve countries interested in enhancing cooperation in the field of monetary and security policy based on 
acquis communautaire. The second circle was to involve the remaining Member States and all EU candidate 
countries. Their cooperation was to be based on a single market, selected community policies and certain as-
pects of external security. The third ‘concentric circle’ was to be formed by the remaining European countries 
whose possible accession to the EU would take place at a later term and whose relations with the EU were to be 
based on a loose form of economic and political cooperation. See: Überlegungen zu einer europäischen Politik, 
CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 1. September 1994, www. cdu/csu. de, pp. 1–11. J.J. Węc, op. cit., pp. 257–261 
(access: 30.09.2918).
24 Gemeinsamer Brief des deutschen Bundeskanzlers und des französischen Staatspräsidenten an den Vor-
sitzenden des Europäischen Rates vom 6.12.1995, [in:] Die Reform der Europäischen Union. Analysen – Positio-
nen – Dokumente zur Regierungskonferenz 1996/97, M. Jopp und O. Schmuck (eds.), Bonn 1996, pp. 115–117 
(access: 30.09.2018).
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decision-making rule employed in the common foreign and security policy; the solidar-
ity clause ought to be introduced to the Maastricht Treaty; a policy planning and early 
warning unit (PPEWU) should be established; the Petersberg tasks, previously under 
the Western European Union (WEU), ought to be included into the European Union; 
and WEU should be incorporated into the EU in the future.25
Although the joint draft devised by Kohl and Chirac suggested that the changes in 
the institutional system, the reform of the second and third pillars, and the establish-
ment of enhanced cooperation could provide a foundation for a compromise between 
the governments of both states before the forthcoming intergovernmental conference,26 
de Charette’s and Kinkel’s guidelines confirmed that one of the key priorities for both 
these countries was to reform common foreign and security policy of the European 
Union, nonetheless. Still, the German government aimed also to introduce a radical 
change in the voting system in the EU Council, which for the time being was covertly 
referred to in Kohl’s and Chirac’s draft as willingness to verify the “current weighted 
voting system”. Yet, the federal government was in fact explicitly keen to introduce the 
so-called double majority (i.e. the majority of states and the majority of citizens repre-
senting the states) to the qualified majority voting procedure in the EU Council, since 
it would result in a new balance of powers within this institution due to Germany’s 
demographic potential.
When the Turin European Council formally opened the conference on 29 March 
1996, the Italian Presidency submitted preliminary reform proposals to the meeting 
participants. These outlined four main directions of change. The first one pertained to 
transformations in the institutional system, i.a. extending the use of qualified majority 
voting in the EU Council and reducing the number of commissioners in the European 
Commission from two to one in case of the largest Member States. The second direc-
tion of change provided for a reform of the second pillar of the EU, which consisted in, 
among others, establishing the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. The third direction of change covered a reform of the third pillar, 
which involved enhancing the fight against transnational organised crime, increasing 
the effectiveness of the European Police Office (Europol), as well as ensuring commu-
nitarisation of cooperation in the area of visa policy, asylum policy and immigration 
policy. The fourth direction of change involved making the EU closer to its citizens 
by means of enhancing protection of fundamental rights and civil liberties, as well as 
tackling unemployment more effectively. The intergovernmental conference under the 
auspices of the Italian Presidency failed to provide the expected results, as the Italian 
government succeeded in developing only an interim report that did not solve any of 
the key issues.27 
25 Deutsch-Französische Leitlinien zur GASP vom 27. Februar 1996, [in:] Die Reform…, pp. 118–120.
26 Which was a success considering the substantially divergent visions of the EU reform presented in 1994 
in Schäuble’s/Lamers’ document and in Balladur’s draft.
27 IGC 1996. Draft. Progress report on the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 12 June 1996, 
CONF 3860/96, pp. 1–47. IGC 1996. Progress report on the Intergovernmental Conference  – Draft texts, 
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The debate on systemic changes in the European Union under the Irish Presiden-
cy was marked by a significant divergence of views between the conference partici-
pants. Initially, all delegations (except for the United Kingdom and Sweden) supported 
the proposal to extend the use of qualified majority voting in the EU Council to include 
both new policies and policies hitherto subject to the unanimity principle. However, 
many governments lodged numerous objections over time, making their final stance 
conditional on the said objections being resolved.28 Opinions of individual delegations 
differed substantially also with regard to the introduction of double majority voting 
in the EU Council. Being the initiator, Germany manifested the greatest interest in 
this change. The stance of the federal government was supported by Italy, the Benelux 
countries, Denmark and Austria. Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Finland and Sweden op-
posed any changes in the said area whatsoever. In contrast, France, the United King-
dom and other Member States called for sustaining the present balance between Ger-
many and other large Member States, which meant that they were in fact against the 
introduction of a double majority system despite being in favour of changing the very 
manner of weighting votes in the EU Council. The majority of delegations were in 
favour of creating the High Representative of the EU Council for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. This idea was most strongly opposed by the Netherlands, which sug-
gested that powers in this area should be delegated to the European Commission and 
that the function of the Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy should 
be formed. What is more, serious divergences of views emerged regarding the integra-
tion of WEU into the EU, as postulated by Germany. This was firmly opposed by the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and Finland, whereas France acted as a mediator in 
this matter, proposing only to strengthen relations between the EU and WEU with both 
organisations’ independent status maintained.29
Individual delegations were also divided on the composition of the European Com-
mission. Supporters of a reduced number of commissioners led by Germany, France 
and Italy argued that this change should result in a ‘dissolution’ of relations between 
REV 1 ADD 1, Brussels, 13 June 1996, CONF 3860/1/96, pp. 1–24. IGC 1996. Progress report on the Intergov-
ernmental Conference, REV 1, Brussels, 17 June 1996, CONF 3860/1/96, pp. 1–47. 
28 IGC 1996. Note from the Presidency. The Institutions of a more democratic and more effective Union, 
Brussels, 20 May 1996, CONF 3849/96, pp. 1–12. IGC 1996. Benelux memorandum on the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference, Brussels, 5 May 1996, CONF 3844/96, pp. 1–15. IGC 1996. Portugal and the Intergovernmental 
Conference for the Revision of the Treaty on European Union, Brussels, 5 May 1996, CONF 3846/96, pp. 1–43. 
IGC 1996. Statement by the Greek Delegation at the Meeting of Ministers’ Representatives on 30 May 1996. 
Institutions – European Parliament, Brussels, 4 June 1996, CONF 3858/96, pp. 1–7. IGC 1996. Basic positions 
of Austria for the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 4 June 1996, CONF 3857/96, pp. 1–21. IGC 1996. 
Commission report on the scope of Article 189b on co-decision, Brussels, 24 July 1996, CONF 3882/96, p. 1. 
IGC 1996. Cover note from Spanish Government. Proposal on the simplification and improvement of the co -
-decision procedure, Brussels, 25 September 1996, CONF 3926/96, pp. 1–3. 
29 Positionen der EU-Regierungen zur Regierungskonferenz, [in:] Die Reform…, pp. 148–149, 152, 
159–160, 167–168, 171–172, 180, 182–183, 188. H. Wallace, Fit für Europa? Reform und Erweiterung der Euro-
päischen Union, „Integration” 1996, No. 2, pp. 90–91. C. Masala, Debatte über die institutionelle Reform der EU, 
„Aussenpolitik”, 1997, H. 3, pp. 228–236. Les orientations de la France pour la Conférence Intergouvernemen-
tale de 1996, Bruxelles, le 20 février 1996, http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/ igc-home/ms-doc/state-fr/200296.
html (access: 30.09.2018). 
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commissioners and their countries of origin, which would further strengthen the supra-
national character of that institution and increase the effectiveness of its actions. How-
ever, in contrast to Germany and Italy, not only did the French delegation demand 
a radical cut in the number of commissioners (down to ten) but also advocated that the 
Commission’s powers should be restricted at the very same time, since, according to the 
delegation, the Commission ought to act based on a precise mandate entrusted to it by 
the EU Council. Nevertheless, the vast majority of delegations (chiefly small countries) 
postulated that the right to appoint one’s representative of the European Commission 
should be retained. The Benelux countries were least opposing the prospect of losing 
their representative in the Commission. Still, the failure to reach agreement on the 
composition of the Commission stemmed chiefly from the ambivalent attitude of large 
Member States. Although Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain declared 
willingness to reduce the total number of commissioners, they did not hide that they 
would rather keep one permanent seat at the commission table as a minimum. Such an 
attitude meant that a possible rotation in the College of the Commission would involve 
only small states. The strongest call for retaining the right to the second representative 
in the European Commission was made by Germany, whereas the Italian delegation 
was the only one of all the delegations of large Member States to express willingness to 
give it up. In contrast, the vast majority of the participants adopted a favourable stance 
on extending the powers of the President of the European Commission.30
A similar convergence of views characterised almost all delegations with regard to 
the increase in the capacities of the European Parliament by means of extending the 
scope of application of co-decision. The British delegation was in principle the only 
one to oppose this proposal and to support the strengthening of the role of national 
parliaments, as did the French delegation. The most far-reaching changes in this regard 
were expected by Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Greece, 
which postulated that co-decision ought to be introduced in all cases where the EU 
Council acted by qualified majority. Moreover, opinions of individual delegations were 
also strongly divided on the German-French idea of enhanced cooperation, which was 
first introduced in the mentioned Kohl’s and Chirac’s draft and then in Kinkel’s and 
de Charette’s joint initiative of 17 October 1996. Both Foreign Ministers proposed en-
hanced cooperation to be extended to cover all the three pillars of the Union, with 
strictly specified procedures and conditions of use. In this respect, Germany and France 
were initially supported only by Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas the remaining 
Member States lodged numerous objections.31
Having familiarised itself with proposals of all delegations, the Irish Presidency 
developed a draft reform treaty, which was then submitted on 5 December 1996 to 
the intergovernmental conference and was debated on the following day by foreign 
30 Positionen…, pp. 152, 159, 167, 172, 178, 180–181. H.  Wallace, Fit für Europa…, pp. 91–92. F.  De-
housse, The IGC Process and Results, [in:] D. O’Keeffe, P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Oxford 1999, pp. 93–98.
31 Positionen…, pp. 148–149, 152, 156–157, 163–164, 170. IGC 1996. Flexibility, Brussels, 22 October 
1996, CONF 3957/96, p. 1.
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ministers at a conclave in Brussels.32 Since the draft was accorded a highly critical recep-
tion by France, on 9 December 1996, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl presented 
a joint letter to Irish Prime Minister John Bruton demanding that further changes be 
introduced. These concerned enhanced cooperation, the establishment of the position 
of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a reduction in the 
number of commissioners in the European Commission, modifications in qualified 
majority voting in the EU Council and redefined thresholds required for undertak-
ing the said procedure.33 Though the Irish Presidency took the French-German letter 
into consideration, it did not bow to all the included postulates. Fearing a negative 
response from smaller Member States, it did not agree to incorporate in its draft under 
preparation the proposed changes in the composition of the European Commission, 
in qualified majority voting in the EU Council or to re-define thresholds required for 
undertaking the said procedure. At the Dublin European Council (13–14 December 
1996), the draft developed by the Irish Presidency was accepted as the starting point 
for further negotiations.34 
Conference meetings gained significant momentum with the initiation of the Dutch 
Presidency. In the course of negotiations large divergences of views between delegations 
came to light once again with regard to the institutional system reform. Yet again, most 
controversy was triggered by proposals concerning changes in qualified majority vot-
ing in the EU Council. On 24 April 1997, the Dutch Presidency presented two change 
options for the weighted voting system and two drafts establishing double majority, 
yet in the course of further deliberations it spoke unequivocally in favour of a less 
radical solution, i.e. a change in the weighted voting system. In response, the German 
government blocked proposals of the Dutch Presidency concerning the use of quali-
fied majority voting in areas of high financial significance, particularly taxes, structural 
funds, social policy and scientific research.35 Consequently, there were no changes in-
corporated in the new reform treaty that was adopted later on, even with regard to the 
weighted voting system.
The further course of these deliberations was impacted in a revolutionary manner by 
the informal European Council meeting held in Noordwijk on 23 May 1997, at which 
consensus was successfully reached on most issues including changes in the institu-
tional system. The meeting participants agreed that following the Eastern enlargement 
of the EU, the European Commission should also comprise twenty members, while 
the largest Member States ought to give up one of their two commissioners. However, 
32 IGC 1996. Council of the European Union. The European Union Today and Tomorrow. Adapting the 
European Union for the Benefit of its peoples and preparing it for the future. A general outline for a draft revi-
sion of Treaties, Dublin II, Brussels, 5 December 1996, CONF 2500/96, pp. 1–141.
33 J.J. Węc, op. cit., pp. 269–270.
34 Presidency Conclusions of the Dublin European Council (13–14 December 1996), http://europa.eu/
rapid/searchResultAction.do, pp. 3–4 (access: 30.09.2018).
35 IGC 1996. Institutions, Brussels, 7 April 1997, CONF 3863/97, pp. 1–6. IGC 1996. Composition, or-
ganization and operation of the Commission, Brussels, 6 March 1997, CONF 3839/97, pp. 1–4. IGC 1996. 
Composition and organization of the Commission, Brussels, 21 March 1997, CONF 3852/97, pp. 1–3. IGC 
1996. Commission, Brussels, 24 April 1997, CONF 3887/97, pp. 1–6; F. Dehousse…, pp. 103–105.
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no agreement was reached on how this concession ought to be compensated for. At 
that time, at least officially, this matter was not associated with the above-mentioned 
changes in qualified majority voting in the EU Council, which was supported mainly 
by Germany and France. Moreover, no conclusions were adopted on the strengthening 
of the position of the European Commission in the EU institutional system, something 
smaller Member States were pressing for. However, it was agreed that the position of 
the President of the European Commission should be strengthened, gaining a direct 
impact on the election of commissioners and the scope of their powers. What is more, 
a consensual solution was adopted on the initiative of Germany and France regarding 
the decision-making procedure in the second pillar. Unanimity was decided to be re-
tained as the voting principle with the so-called constructive abstention introduced in 
situations where a given decision would cause prejudice to essential national interests 
of several Member States. However, constructive abstention in itself would not hinder 
the decision-making process. Eventually, an agreement was also reached with regard 
to the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice in the first pillar, as well 
as partial implementation of the Schengen acquis in the said area.36
At the European Council meeting of 16–17 June 1997 in Amsterdam, conclusions 
of the intergovernmental conference were approved by heads of state or heads of gov-
ernment.37 The key change implemented to the draft reform treaty at the said meeting 
at the request of the United Kingdom, Greece and Austria involved renouncement 
of enhanced cooperation introduced to the common foreign and security policy. On 
2 October 1997, foreign ministers of 15 EU Member States signed in Amsterdam a new 
reform treaty that entered into force on 1 May 1990.38 
The intergovernmental conference of 2000. The Treaty of Nice
The convening of a subsequent intergovernmental conference was heralded in Protocol 
No. 11 on the institution in the view of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union 
annexed to TEU, TECSC, TEC and the EAEC Treaty. As in the case of the 1996–1997 
intergovernmental conference, Germany and France were the first Member States 
to take a diplomatic initiative in this matter. On 9 June 1998, Chancellor Kohl and 
President Chirac in a joint letter called upon British Prime Minister Tony Blair acting 
as the EU President to urgently address three issues at the forthcoming meeting of the 
European Council: the principle of subsidiarity, the related distribution of competences 
between the Union and the Member States, and changes in the institutional system not 
addressed at the 1996–1997 intergovernmental conference, on which “an agreement 
36 Archiv der Gegenwart, 1997, pp. 42041–42042.
37 Presidency Conclusions of the Amsterdam European Council (16–17 June 1997), http://europa.eu/
rapid/searchResultAction.do, s. 1 (access: 30.09.2018). 
38 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C, 1997, No. 340. 
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must be reached prior to the anticipated (Eastern) enlargement” of the EU. Kohl and 
Chirac argued further in the letter that since
some European institutions become increasingly estranged from citizens and their daily-life prob-
lems, it would be necessary (…) that members of the European Council initiate a discussion on how 
to apply the subsidiarity principle in practice to allow for a clear distribution of competences be-
tween the EU and the Member States (…). Changes of this sort would have nothing in common with 
renationalisation, as they would rather correspond to the principle of proportionality, closeness to 
the citizen and effectiveness (of the EU), and would contribute to the prevention of excessive centra-
lism. Therefore, we ought to (…) allow greater freedom to national-level institutions. Nevertheless, 
integration in certain areas would undoubtedly require urgent enhancement, particularly as regards 
common foreign and security policy.39
The issue of the application of the principle of subsidiarity and the related distri-
bution of competences between the European Union and the Member States made 
a strong emotional impact already at the 1996–1997 intergovernmental conference. 
Though the Member States that supported the reinforcement of the Community meth-
od or federal solutions, such as Germany and the Benelux countries, considered the 
principle of subsidiarity an instrument for enhancing subjectivity of regional structures 
within the state or even for limiting national sovereignty, the United Kingdom and the 
Scandinavian countries, for that matter, intended to employ the principle of subsidiarity 
in order to reclaim full independence of the state in areas such as education, culture, 
social policy, healthcare, consumer protection, environmental protection and transport.
Nevertheless, Chirac’s and Kohl’s views influenced the conclusions of the European 
Council adopted several days later in Cardiff (15–16 June 1998). The European Council 
declared in the said conclusions that upon the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
relevant decisions would be made “on how and when to tackle the institutional issues 
not resolved at Amsterdam.” Assuming that there is an urgent “need to bring the EU 
closer to people and to focus it on the issues that matter most to the European citizens,” 
it also supported the intention to enhance “democratic legitimacy and making a reality 
of subsidiarity”.40 One year later, at a meeting held on 3–4 June 1999 in Cologne, the 
European Council heralded a run-up to a subsequent intergovernmental conference, 
which was to address in principle changes in the composition of the European Com-
mission, qualified majority voting in the EU Council (a new method for weighting votes 
or introducing double majority), as well as a possible extension of the use of qualified 
majority voting to new cases. Moreover, the conference could also discuss other changes 
in the treaties related to the institutional system.41 The conference agenda was then fur-
ther specified by the European Council at a meeting held on 10–11 December 1999 
39 AdG, 1999, pp. 42870–42871.
40 Cardiff European Council. Presidency Conclusions, 15–16 June 1998, http://www.consilium.europa.
eu, p. 21 (access: 30.09.2018).
41 Cologne European Council. Presidency Conclusions, 3–4 June 1999, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
pl/european-council/conclusions/1993–2003, p. 20 (access: 30.09.2018). 
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in Helsinki. At that time, it was agreed that aside from the three so-called Amsterdam 
leftovers mentioned above, it will also address changes in the institutional system that 
stem from the planned Eastern enlargement of the European Union that pertain to the 
European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The conference was intended to 
commence its proceedings in February 2000 and complete them in December of the 
same year.42 
In the first stage of the intergovernmental conference held under the Portuguese 
Presidency, most controversy was evoked once again by the issue of changing the quali-
fied majority voting system in the EU Council. As at the 1996–1997 intergovernmental 
conference, Germany submitted a proposal to incorporate double majority to the said 
system. As before, the federal government’s initiative was supported by Austria, the 
Benelux countries and Denmark, while Italy was not in favour. However, Germany 
received support in this matter from yet another country, namely Greece. In turn, the 
United Kingdom, Portugal and Italy expressed some concerns regarding double ma-
jority, though they did not reject it categorically. Whereas the remaining five Member 
States, particularly France, Spain and Sweden, demanded that changes be introduced 
only with respect to vote weighting.43 
Controversies pertained also to the extension of the scope of qualified majority to new 
cases. Italy and the Benelux countries postulated that qualified majority voting ought to 
be considered the general decision-making rule, though under the condition that a spe-
cific list of exceptions where decisions would be made by unanimity is drawn up. Ger-
many opposed the development of the list of exceptions, assuming that some countries 
would pursue it as a means for blocking the optional use of this procedure in numerous 
areas. The development of the said list of exceptions was also opposed for a thoroughly 
different reason by the United Kingdom and Sweden. The said states demanded that de-
cisions are made on a case-by-case basis, which would apply in all cases where decisions 
42 Helsinki European Council (10–11 December 1999). Presidency Conclusions, http://europa.eu.int/co-
uncil/, p. 2 (access: 30.09.2018). 
43 IGC 2000. Italy’s position, Brussels, 3 March 2000, CONFER 4717/00, pp. 1–8. IGC 2000. Memoran-
dum from the Greek Government to the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform of the Euro-
pean Union, Brussels, 3 March 2000, CONFER 4719/00, pp. 1–8. IGC 2000. Contribution from the Dutch Go-
vernment: An agenda for internal reforms in the European Union, Brussels, 6 March 2000, CONFER 4720/00, 
pp. 1–20; IGC 2000. Memorandum from Benelux, Brussels, 7 March 2000, CONFER 4721/00, pp. 1–4. IGC 
2000. Contribution from the Danish Government: Basis for negotiations, Brussels, 7 March 2000, CONFER 
4722/00, pp. 1–5; IGC 2000. Contribution from the Finnish Government: Background and objectives in the 
IGC 2000, Brussels, 7 March 2000, CONFER 4723/00, pp. 1–19; IGC 2000. Basic principles of Austria’s po-
sition, Brussels, 15 February 2000, CONFER 4712/00, pp. 1–9; IGC 2000. Policy document of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform, Brussels, 30 March 2000, 
CONFER 4733/00, pp. 1–8; IGC 2000. Weightings of votes in the Council. Presidency note, Brussels, 24 May 
2000, CONFER 4745/00, pp. 1–8. IGC 2000. Cover note from Italian delegation. Reweighting Member States’ 
votes in the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 16 June 2000, CONFER 4751/1/00, REV 1, pp. 1–13. 
G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Deutsche Leadership in der Europäischen Union? Die Europapolitik der rot-grü-
nen Bundesregierung 1998–2002, [in:] G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (et al.), Deutsche Europapolitik von Kon-
rad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, Opladen 2002, pp. 180–181.
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were formerly made by unanimity. In this very way, they intended to limit the possibility 
of the said procedure being applied in an excessively high number of new cases.44 
Regarding the composition of the European Commission, the majority of the Mem-
ber States defended the ‘one commissioner per country’ principle. Belgium and France, 
which at the previous intergovernmental conference postulated that the number of 
commissioners should be limited, strengthened their stances in this matter. The French 
delegation was also against further strengthening of the position of the President of the 
European Commission, arguing that it could cause internal imbalance within the said 
institution. What is more, the Netherlands proposed defining individual liability of 
commissioners, which would allow the obligation to dismiss the entire Commission to 
be avoided in the event that the Parliament’s trust is lost by one or more commission-
ers. The right to dismiss one or more commissioners would fall within the competence 
of the President of the Commission, still it would require approval of the European 
Council. The vast majority of delegations were convinced of the necessity to enhance 
the powers of the European Parliament by means of extending the scope of application 
of the co-decision procedure. Though Germany and the Benelux countries proposed 
that this procedure should be employed in the very same cases where qualified major-
ity voting was to be binding in the EU Council, the majority of delegations demanded 
that decisions are made on case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the Netherlands postulated 
that, in the event that the entire European Commission is dismissed, the European 
Parliament should also be dissolved and new elections ought to be held. The majority of 
delegations were also in favour of a redistribution of seats in the European Parliament, 
the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions due to the planned Eastern enlargement of the Eu-
ropean Union. The Netherlands supported by the United Kingdom demanded a more 
in-depth reform of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance that would 
entail, i.a. delegating some powers of the Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance, 
as well as a gradual transition from sitting in full to sitting in chambers as regards de-
ciding cases. Many controversies were also provoked by enhanced cooperation.45 In this 
regard, the fundamental dividing line ran between those advocating retention of the 
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and those in favour of facilitated conditions for es-
tablishing such cooperation binding at the time, which included primarily the removal 
of veto powers and modification of the requirement that over half of the Member States 
participate in enhanced cooperation.46 
44 IGC 2000. Presidency note. Possible extension of qualified majority voting – Articles which could move 
to qualified majority voting as they stand, Brussels, 11 February 2000, CONFER 4706/1/00, REV 1, pp. 1–8. 
IGC 2000. Presidency note. Possible extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) – Introductory note, Brus-
sels, 11 February 2000, CONFER 4705/1/00, REV 1, pp. 1–2; IGC 2000. Note from the Presidency. Intergo-
vernmental Conference – Possible extension of qualified majority voting, Brussels, 6 April 2000, CONFER 
4734/00, pp. 1–3.
45 T. Wiedmann, Der Vertrag von Nizza – Genesis einer Reform, „Europarecht”, 2001, H. 2, pp. 185–202.
46 IGC 2000. Presidency note. Other amendments to be made to the Treaties with regard to the Europe-
an institutions – European Parliament, Brussels, 24 February 2000, CONFER 4713/00, pp. 1–5. IGC 2000. 
Note from the Presidency. Other amendments to the Treaties with regard to: the Court of Auditors – the 
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On 14 June 2000, the Portuguese Presidency submitted an interim report that sum-
marised outcomes of previous deliberations. Regarding the definition of qualified ma-
jority, in the said report three options for the application of double majority voting 
and two drafts regarding simple modification to the weighted voting scheme for the 
Union in the twenty-seven EU Member States (EU 27) were presented. The first double 
majority option stipulated 50.1% of the Member States, representing 50.1% of the EU 
population. The second option involved the existing weighted voting system and in-
troduced a demographic clause. The third option consisted in changing the number of 
weighed votes and linking it to the demographic clause. In line with the second option, 
decisions in the EU Council were to be adopted by a qualified majority of 96 votes of 
the total 134 votes, representing 58% of the EU population, whereas the third option 
envisaged a qualified majority of 214 votes of the total 298 votes cast by 58 or 60% of 
the EU population. As for the simple modification to the weighted voting scheme, the 
characteristic feature of the first draft was that it constituted an extrapolation of the 
system binding at that time and assumed that decisions in the EU Council were to be 
made by a qualified majority of 234 votes of the total 330 votes. Whereas in the second 
draft, the number of votes for each state was estimated as the square root of its popula-
tion figure (in millions) rounded to the nearest integer and assumed that the mentioned 
decisions were to be adopted by a majority of 134 votes of the total 188 votes. As for 
the extended scope of application of the procedure for qualified majority voting in the 
EU Council, the Portuguese Presidency developed a list of twenty-eight system articles 
that should be subject to unanimous voting. These pertained to, i.a. common defence, 
treaty reform, accession of new Member States to the European Union, own resources, 
a uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament, amendments to draft leg-
islation of the European Commission, changes in the minutes on the excessive deficit 
procedure, amended number of members in the College of the Commission, as well as 
a second reading in the co-decision procedure following a negative opinion issued by 
the Commission. Moreover, the presidency submitted a list of twenty-one cases where 
it proposed application of the co-decision procedure in the legislative process, thus sig-
nificantly strengthening the role of the European Parliament. Regarding the composi-
tion of the European Commission, the presidency proposed that the ‘one commissioner 
per country’ principle should be retained, while the position of the President of the 
Economic and Social Committee  – the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 24 February 2000, CONFER 
4715/00, pp. 1–4. IGC 2000. Note from the Presidency. The Commission, Brussels, 24 March 2000, CONFER 
4727/00, pp. 1–5. IGC 2000. Note from the Presidency. The Commission, Brussels, 24 May 2000, CONFER 
4744/00, pp. 1–4. IGC 2000. Size and composition of the European Commission, Brussels, 26 May 2000, 
CONFER 4746/00, pp. 1–8. IGC 2000. European Parliament resolution containing the European Parliament’s 
proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference, 13 April 2000, pp. 2–5. IGC 2000. European Parliament 
resolution on the preparation of the reform of the Treaties and the next Intergovernmental Conference, 18 No-
vember 1999, pp. 5–8. IGC 2000. Adapting the Institutions to make a success of enlargement. Contribution 
by the European Commission to preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional issues…, 
pp. 1–66. IGC 2000. Conduct of the IGC…, p. 2. G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Deutsche Leadership in der 
Europäischen Union?…, pp. 177–186. J. Leinen, Die Positionen und Erwartungen des Europäischen Parlaments 
zur Regierungskonferenz, „Integration”, 2000, H. 2, pp. 73–80.
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Commission should be strengthened at the same time an internal hierarchy should be 
established or the number of commissioners should be reduced and a rotation system 
between individual Member States ought to be introduced. Changes concerning the 
distribution of seats in the European Parliament provided that the existing number of 
seven hundred members should be maintained.47
In the second stage of the 2000 intergovernmental conference held under the French 
Presidency, most of issues disputed at that time were successfully solved. First, at the 
European Council meeting in Biarritz (13–14 October 2000) a preliminary consensus 
was reached on two matters, namely, the extension of the scope of application of quali-
fied majority voting in the EU Council and changes in the establishment of enhanced 
cooperation procedure.48 However, the final discussion on the remaining issues was 
rescheduled to the Nice European Council of December 2000, which was intended to 
close the French Presidency. This was due to the divergence of views between large and 
small Member States, which was still excessive at the time and, primarily, an overlap 
between the said views and a clear disagreement between Germany and France, which 
were caused mainly by the French delegation’s withdrawal from previously declared 
support for the key postulate of the federal government, i.e. to introduce double major-
ity voting in the EU Council.49
The Nice European Council of 7–11 December 2000 was one of the most dramat-
ic deliberations in the history of the European Union.50 Nevertheless, at the meeting 
a compromise was successfully reached on all previously unsolved issues, which were 
combined into one negotiating package. It thus made the adoption of solutions in favour 
 
47 IGC 2000. Presidency note. Extension of qualified majority voting, Brussels, 3 July 2000, CONFER 
4753/00, pp. 1–19. IGC 2000. Presidency report to the Feira European Council. Intergovernmental Conferen-
ce on institutional reform, Brussels, 14 June 2000, CONFER 4750/00, pp. 11–36, 59–61, 63–71, 91–95.
48 IGC 2000. Presidency note. Extension of qualified majority voting, Brussels, 28 September 2000, 
CONFER 4776/00, pp. 1–45. IGC 2000. Note from Presidency. Closer cooperation, Brussels, 5 October 2000, 
CONFER 4780/00, pp. 1–5. As the deliberations of the 2000 intergovernmental conference were gaining mo-
mentum, governments of the Member States began submitting more and more new proposals on the system 
reform of the EU, the most important of which were the initiatives put forward by German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer (12 May), French President Chirac (27 June) and British Prime Minister Blair (6 October). 
Fischer spoke in favour of forming a federation of national states and signing a European constitution, while 
Chirac proposed to deepen integration through enhanced cooperation executed by a “pioneer group” led by 
France and Germany, whereas Blair urged, among others, that a strict division of powers should be made be-
tween the European Union and the Member States. However, these initiatives did not make any significant im-
pact on the further course of the intergovernmental conference, though they did raise the participants’ aware-
ness of the necessity to implement the EU reform in two stages. This decision was made by foreign ministers 
of the Member States at an informal meeting in Evian (2–3 September 2000). The first stage ought to provide 
a consensus on the key changes vital from the perspective of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, 
while the substantial system reform of the EU was not to be implemented until the second stage together with 
the optional adoption of a European constitution. See: J.J. Węc, op. cit., p. 310.
49 G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Deutsche Leadership in der Europäischen Union?…, pp. 180–183. R. Cor-
bett, F. Jacobs, M. Shackleton…, p. 304.
50 G.  Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Deutsche Leadership in der Europäischen Union?…, pp. 180–184. 
M. Gray, A. Stubb, Keynote Article. The Treaty of Nice: Negotiating a Poisoned Chalice, „Journal of Common 
Market Studies” 2001, Supplement 1, pp. 15–16.
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of large Member States easier for medium-sized and small Member States. The modifica-
tion of the procedure for qualified majority voting in the EU Council was a compromise 
between the double majority system and the simple modification to the weighted vot-
ing scheme, particularly between the above-mentioned third option of double majority 
and the first option of simple modification to the weighted voting scheme, proposed 
by the Portuguese Presidency in the interim report back on 14 June 2000. The change 
in the weighted voting system consisted in a significant enhancement in the nominal 
value of votes of each state in a way that explicitly favoured large Member States. It was 
concurrently linked to each Member State’s right to demand that the respect of the 62% 
of the EU population threshold is verified. Furthermore, the provision binding at that 
time was retained, according to which that in cases of drafts submitted by the European 
Commission, decision-making by qualified majority required approval of the majority 
of the Member States, while in cases where the proposal is not made by the Commission, 
approval of two-thirds of the Member States is required. In return for their approval for 
the mentioned change in the procedure for qualified majority voting, medium-sized 
and small Member States succeeded in forcing through their proposal to preserve (until 
the accession of the twenty-seventh state to the EU) the ‘one commissioner per coun-
try’ principle applied for allocating seats in the European Commission in relation to 
the strengthened position of the President of the Commission. Another concession for 
medium-sized and small Member States was the new distribution of seats in the Euro-
pean Parliament, which was in favour of the said states to the detriment of large member 
states. The total number of seats was increased from seven hundred to seven hundred 
and thirty-two, although the previously discussed minimum number of seats per a Mem-
ber State was not settled. Hence, Belgium, Greece and Portugal received two seats more 
than previously (22), while France, the United Kingdom and Italy lost as many as fifteen 
seats each (72), whereas Spain lost fourteen seats (50). The only large state to successfully 
maintain its previous number of seats was Germany (99). Lastly, in return for a smaller 
number of weighted votes in the EU Council granted to Belgium, it was decided that one 
meeting of the European Council would take place in Brussels starting from 2002 and 
that all meetings of the said body would be held there following the Union’s enlargement, 
as a result of which the EU was to comprise eighteen states. As for the composition of the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, a simple 
rule was adopted to retain the number of representatives of the old Member States to add 
representatives of the new Member States according to a key resulting from extrapolation 
of the distribution of seats binding at the time. Having reached compromise on all the 
mentioned issues, the European Council adopted a preliminary version of the new trea-
ty.51 On 26 February 2001, foreign ministers of the Member States signed a new reform 
treaty in Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003.52
51 CIG 2000. Projet de Traité de Nice, Conférence intergouvernementale sur la réforme institutionelle, 
Bruxelles, le 6 décembre 2000, CONFER 4816/00, pp. 1–120. 
52 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Com-
munities and certain related acts, signed at Nice, 26 February 2001, O.J. C, 2001, No. 80.
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Conclusions
Importantly, the federal government’s agreement to the establishment of the European 
Union under the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 indicated that it withdrew from 
the iunctim promoted in the years 1989–1991, which involved a concurrent estab-
lishment of a Political Union and the EMU as the prototype of a ‘European feder-
al state’. The German government withdrew from the Political Union agenda in fa-
vour of the European Union not solely because the former was negated by the majority 
of the Member States, but also due to the fact that one of the fundamental axioms of 
Germany’s European policy (in force since the time of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer), 
namely, that the European Federation would facilitate other European countries’ ap-
proval of the unification, had become obsolete due to the German reunification of 
1990. The decision on withdrawing from actions aiming to form a Political Union as 
an international organisation with a uniform political system and complex suprana-
tional architecture had a revolutionary impact on further European integration, since 
as a consequence, a decision was made to establish the European Union, which as 
a sui generis organisation was characterised by a substantial lack of cohesion. Not only 
was it based on three pillars but also had two different legal orders as its foundations, 
namely, Community law (the first pillar) and public international law (the second 
and the third pillars). Moreover, the withdrawal from the Political Union agenda meant 
for the most part depriving the EMU of the above-mentioned safeguard against ten-
sions occurring between monetary policy and fiscal policy, with its stable operation 
no longer guaranteed. 
At the 1996–1997 intergovernmental conference, apart from the majority of diplo-
matic initiatives regarding the system reform of the EU being submitted by Germany 
and France, many other German proposals found reflection in the new reform treaty. 
On the initiative of the federal government, enhanced cooperation and most changes 
in the common foreign and security policy were established in the first and the third 
pillar of the Union, which involved the creation of a policy planning and early warning 
unit, the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the European Union, and heralded the 
incorporation of WEU to the EU. However, the German delegation failed, among oth-
ers, to introduce double majority in the decision-making procedure in the EU Council, 
to limit the number of the European Commissioners by means of a rotation system, to 
extend the scope of application of the co-decision legislative procedure in the European 
Parliament to all cases where the EU Council acts by qualified majority, to renounce the 
unanimity rule for decision-making in the common foreign and security policy, and to 
introduce enhanced cooperation and the solidarity clause to the said policy. Another 
conclusion that proved inconsistent with the German government’s expectations was 
the decision that the European Commission ought to comprise twenty members even 
following the Eastern enlargement of the EU, while the largest member states would 
surrender one of their two commissioners.
At the 2000 intergovernmental conference, the German delegation acted rather 
alone on many issues. Despite having presented a joint initiative to convene the said 
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conference already in June 1998, the German and French governments did not enjoy 
a successful collaboration during the negotiations. Though the federal government suc-
ceeded in extending enhanced cooperation to the second pillar of the Union, it was un-
able to force through its main proposal to establish double majority in the EU Council, 
which even led to a disagreement with France. As a result, the resolution of this case 
was deferred, at least in the view of Germany. What is more, the German delegation 
failed at its attempts to extend the co-decision legislative procedure in the European 
Parliament to all cases where the EU Council acts by qualified majority, to strengthen 
the principle of subsidiarity and to establish a strict distribution of competences be-
tween the EU and the member states, and to limit the number of European Commis-
sioners by means of introducing a rotation system to the Commission. 
The modification of the procedure for qualified majority voting made under the 
Treaty of Nice proved substantially beneficial for all large Member States and candi-
date countries, i.e. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland. The 
ones to gain the most were Spain and Poland (31% of the voting weight), followed by 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy (13% of the voting weight each). Of 
all the medium-sized member states, the Netherlands was the only one to derive ben-
efits (1% of the voting weight). All the other Member States and candidate countries 
incurred losses, the greatest of which were experienced by small candidate countries, 
namely, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia (50% of the voting weight each) and Malta (40% of 
the voting weight). However, the introduction of the 62% minimum EU population 
threshold favoured the most populated Member States, allowing a given decision to be 
blocked by a coalition of as few as three of them (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France), even if they fail to form a blocking minority. In turn, blocking of a decision 
on the basis of the number of votes and not the demographic potential required only 
an agreement of three large countries (e.g. Spain and Poland) and one medium-sized 
country with six votes as a minimum (e.g. Lithuania).
